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Abstract—Cybersecurity has become a key factor that deter-
mines the success or failure of companies that rely on information
systems. Therefore, investment in cybersecurity is an important
financial and operational decision. Typical information technology
investments aim to create value, whereas cybersecurity invest-
ments aim to minimize loss incurred by cyber attacks. Admittedly,
cybersecurity investment has become an increasingly complex
one since information systems are typically subject to frequent
attacks, whose arrival and impact fluctuate stochastically. Fur-
ther, cybersecurity measures and improvements, such as patches,
become available at random points in time making investment
decisions even more challenging.
We propose and develop an analytical real options framework
that incorporates major components relevant to cybersecurity
practice, and analyze how optimal cybersecurity investment de-
cisions perform for a private firm. The novelty of this paper is that
it provides analytical solutions that lend themselves to intuitive
interpretations regarding the effect of timing and cybersecurity
risk on investment behavior using real options theory. Such
aspects are frequently not implemented within economic models
that support policy initiatives. However, if these are not properly
understood, security controls will not be properly set resulting
in a dynamic inefficiency reflected in cycles of over or under
investment, and, in turn, increased cybersecurity risk following
corrective policy actions.
Results indicate that greater uncertainty over the cost of
cybersecurity attacks raises the value of an embedded option
to invest in cybersecurity. This increases the incentive to suspend
operations temporarily in order to install a cybersecurity patch
that will make the firm more resilient to cybersecurity breaches.
Similarly, greater likelihood associated with the availability of a
cybersecurity patch increases the value of the option to invest in
cybersecurity. However, absence of an embedded investment op-
tion increases the incentive to delay the permanent abandonment
of the company’s operation due to the irreversible nature of the
decision.
Keywords—Cybersecurity, investment analysis, real options.
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis made Information Technology (IT) in-
frastructures around the world change their whole business
plans and often reduce their expenses. Although these reduc-
tions may not have been reflected on the productivity line, this
is not the case when it comes to cybersecurity. Cyber attackers
have advanced their technology and have managed to be one
step ahead of those who try to defend their infrastructures.
From 2013 and on-wards, the frequency of identified Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs) has greatly increased. APT’s number
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one target were always organizations with high value assets.
This is the main reason behind the persistency of those at-
tacks. Lately, WannaCry malware belonging to the ransomware
family attacked in global scale affecting a lot of countries
around the world, and, in a lot of cases, critical infrastructure
such as United Kingdom’s National Health System (NHS) [1].
Although in the beginning it seemed that malicious parties
behind the attacks were trying only to make money, soon
afterwards, it was implied that this was not the case, as the
money made from the global scale attack were not so much.
The NHS case needs special attention as not only it is a critical
infrastructure, but also there are many cases of people who
faced issues regarding their treatment with the commonest of
all being large delays.
However, cybersecurity is not only a defensive maneuver
but also a strategic decision that may increase the competitive
advantage of a firm over potential rivals. The importance
of cybersecurity has led many organizations to pay much
attention to cybersecurity investment decisions, especially to
derive the appropriate level of these investments. This was
firstly investigated by [2] and later on investigated by [3], [4],
[5]. Cybersecurity spending is occurring in a variety of areas
including software to detect viruses, firewalls, sophisticated
encryption techniques, intrusion detection systems, automated
data backup, and hardware devices.
A critical observation, in [2], is that despite organizations
being satisfied with their Return On Investment (ROI), cyber
adversaries very often appear more incentivized to breach an
organization’s system towards satisfying a variety of objec-
tives. While the “defenders” spend millions trying to protect
their systems from cyber attackers, the latter may only have
to spend a small amount of money to breach cybersecurity
controls. This is for example due to social engineering attacks
that can bypass cybersecurity best practices.
In addition to this, the range and scope of cyber attacks
create the need for organizations to prioritize the manner
in which they defend themselves. With this in mind, each
organization needs to consider the threats that they are most at
risk from and act in such a way so as to reduce the vulnerability
across as many relevant weaknesses as possible. This is a
particularly difficult task that many Chief Information Security
Officers (CISOs) are not confident in achieving due to: (i) lack
of sufficient budget; (ii) uncertainty regarding the cost of cyber
attacks and the availability of cybersecurity controls; and (iii)
irreversibility of expenditures related to cybersecurity controls.
This work implements these features into an analytical real
options framework and addresses the problem of when to
invest in cybersecurity by deriving the optimal investment rule
and analyzing the implications of deviating from it.
Even with all the focus on security, the number of unau-
thorized intrusions and cybersecurity breaches are steadily in-
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creasing. This has been attributed partly to poor understanding
of the economics of investing in cybersecurity resulting in
ad-hoc decisions. Additionally, these decisions are not viable
from a cost-benefit perspective, since trying to patch most, if
not all, of a firm’s potential security vulnerabilities, to avoid
cybersecurity breaches, could manifest a clear over-investment
in cybersecurity.
Given the uncertainties surrounding cybersecurity breaches
and efforts to prevent such breaches, a third explanation for
the ubiquitous nature of cybersecurity vulnerabilities may be
that it is economically rational to initially invest a portion of
the cybersecurity budget and defer remaining investments until
cybersecurity breaches actually occur. In other words, it may
pay to take a wait-and-see attitude toward part of the invest-
ments made in cybersecurity activities, as firstly proposed in
[6]. This explanation is akin to the notion of the deferment
option discussed in the modern economics literature on capital
budgeting [7]. To the extent that this explanation is correct, we
would expect organizations to use cybersecurity breaches as a
critical determinant of their actual (as opposed to budgeted)
expenditures on cybersecurity. Since cybersecurity investments
involve decision-making under uncertainty, it seems appropri-
ate to borrow notions and techniques used by real options
theory, a branch of financial investment theory which accounts
for deferred investment to drive better cybersecurity investment
decision-making.
In this paper, we consider a firm that holds a perpetual option
to invest in a project that is subject to cyber attacks. The attacks
take place in continuous time, and, once their cost reaches a
critical threshold, the firm must either terminate operations or
invest in cybersecurity, thereby making its infrastructure more
resilient to cyber attacks. In summary, our proposal for de-
signing optimal cybersecurity investment decisions showcases
three contributions:
i. Our analytical real options framework explores how cy-
ber attacks impact the value of a project in the presence
of an embedded option to invest in cybersecurity.
ii. Our analytical results assess the impact of cost and
technological uncertainty on the value of a project, the
option to invest in cybersecurity, and the loss in value
when such options are not taken into account.
iii. Our framework provides managerial insights based on
analytical and numerical results.
Figure 1 provides a concise, visual summary of the model
and scope of the article. We have assumed that a cybersecurity
provider releases a patch during the period of an active firm’s
project. The arrival of the patch is stochastic. The adversary
captures all the different attacks that are launched against the
firm’s project and they also arrive in a stochastic manner.
In parallel, we assume that the efficiency of the project is
affected by cybersecurity incidents, caused by attacks. Our
proposed method and tool, determines the right time to invest
in cybersecurity (i.e. acquire a patch), which is, in fact, dictates
when the company must cease and subsequently commence
operations.
We proceed by discussing important related work in Section
II and introduce assumptions and notation in Section III. In
Section IV-A, we address the problem of optimal investment
timing without taking into account a firm’s flexibility to rein-
vest, and, in Section IV-B, we assume that the firm has a single
embedded option to resume the project after a cybersecurity
breach. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and offers
directions for further research.
II. RELATED WORK
In [6], Gordon et al. first introduced the concept of tim-
ing into cybersecurity investment proposing a “wait-and-see”
tactic. Their approach suggested not to over-invest into cy-
bersecurity controls without knowing with certainty that these
will be used at some point to mitigate an attack. And the
only way to acquire this knowledge is to wait until a non-
catastrophic incident happens; thereafter the defender shall
react by investing into defenses. However, a limitation of this
approach, as opposed to work here, is that it is based on a
discrete-time framework that does not take into account the
sequential nature of such catastrophic events and the need to
repeat this strategy over time.
Early work in the area of sequential investments includes
[8], which shows how traditional valuation methods understate
the value of a project by ignoring the flexibility embedded
in the time to build. An analytical framework for sequential
investment is developed by Dixit and Pindyck [9], who assume
that the output price follows a geometric Brownian motion
(GBM), the project value depreciates exponentially, and the
investor has an infinite set of replacement options. A com-
parison between a sequence of small nuclear power plants
with a single, large power plant is down in [10], who show
that the value of modularity may trigger investment in the
initial module at a price level below the now–or–never net
present value (NPV) threshold. Møller et al. [11] illustrate how
embedded investment options make the required investment
threshold less sensitive to changes in uncertainty and the
investment behaviour similar to the simple NPV rule. By
comparing a single–stage investment to a stepwise investment
strategy, Kort et al. [12] show that greater price uncertainty
makes the former strategy more attractive relative to the latter
by increasing the incentive to avoid costly switches between
states.
Examples of analytical real options frameworks that allow
for the random arrival of technological innovations include [13]
indicating that the timing of technology adoption is influenced
by expectations about future technological changes and that
technological uncertainty tends to delay adoption. In [14]
authors develop a model for sequential investment, whereby
a firm may either adopt every technology that becomes avail-
able, skip an old technology in order to adopt the next one, pur-
chase only an early innovation, or wait for a new technology
to arrive before adopting the previous one. In each case, they
illustrate how the rate of innovation and technological growth
impact the optimal technology–adoption strategy and find that
a firm may adopt an available technology despite the likely
arrival of more efficient innovations. Nevertheless, how price
and technological uncertainty interact to affect the optimal in-
vestment rule under each strategy is not thoroughly discussed.
In [15], Farzin et al. investigate the optimal timing of
technology adoption assuming that new technologies arrive
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Fig. 1. High level diagrammatic overview of our contribution to the field of security economics.
according to a Poisson process, however, they ignore output
price uncertainty. In [16], Doraszelski revisits the analytical
framework in [15] and shows that, compared to the NPV
approach, a firm will defer the adoption of a new technology
when it takes the option value of waiting into account. Huis-
man and Kort analyze, in [17], a duopoly in which firms
face price and technological uncertainty and show that the
efficiency of a new technology can offset the monopoly profits
that a leader receives while being alone in the market, thereby
turning a preemption game into one where the second mover
receives a higher pay-off. In [18], Kauffman and Li use a
standard Brownian motion in order to describe uncertainty
in the outcome of technology competition and analyze the
investment strategy of a firm that can choose between two
competing technologies. Miltersen and Schwartz adopt a real
options approach for valuing R&D projects under uncertain
time to completion, operational flexibility, and competition
[19].
Gordon et al. [20] extend their previous work [6] on
the application of real options to cybersecurity investment
by taking into account information sharing, for example re-
garding vulnerabilities. They show that information sharing
can decrease uncertainty about risks, thereby decreasing the
value of deferment options; therefore optimal investments may
take place early. They also use an example to show how to
calculate the minimum value of information sharing required
so that the company invests straightaway in cybersecurity. The
authors discuss the limitations of their work. Importantly, they
assume that the reduction of risks occurs only due to in-
creased information sharing; ignoring completely that waiting
may have more benefits, such as more efficient cybersecurity
controls are available to purchase. Another limitation of [20]
and [6] is that they do not develop a formal model, and,
as a result, they do not derive an optimal solution. While
our work does not consider information sharing, it accounts
for managerial discretion in terms of the option to adopt a
cybersecurity control and the option to postpone termination
or commencement of operations.
In [21], Daneva summarises the main ways of applying
real options analysis to cybersecurity investments. The paper
provides examples of the most common types of real options as
applied to the cross-organizational information security context
for specific purposes such as achieving better timing for an
investment. The author proposes a five-phases methodology
to approach real-options-based security decision support. For
each phase, she presents relevant research questions and dis-
cusses the challenges in developing a particular approach. Our
paper reflects an adaptation of this methodology, whereby
we: (i) take into account the likely arrival of security op-
tions; (ii) identify key underlying uncertainties; (iii) select a
suitable mathematical model, namely dynamic programming;
(iv) derive the optimal decision rule; and (v) provide intuitive
managerial insights.
In [22], Herath and Herath develop an empirical real options
model based on Bayesian statistics to derive optimal cyberse-
curity investments considering a specific cybersecurity mech-
anism, i.e., an intrusion detection system (IDS). They extend
[23] and [24] by including cost and benefits of configuring an
IDS, investigating what is the best timing to invest, and finally
revising the IDS parameters based on Bayesian learning. The
authors suggest that it is preferable to undertake cybersecurity
investments in stages so that they assess the performance of
an IDS, and should new threats, vulnerabilities be identified
or a cybersecurity breach occurs, then they can decide to
invest in improving it. The authors used the American-style
sequential real options. Our work uses perpetual American
style options. Their work suggests to invest into a series of
interrelated investment projects that are made after resolving
uncertainty. A significant contribution of this paper is that the
authors use actual data on e-mail and spam to validate their
framework and the optimality of the determined investment
measured in terms of IDS efficiency.
Given two security technologies S1 and S2, the authors in
[25] propose a decision model that aims to aid managers in
deciding whether (a) to invest in a non-flexible security process
innovation (SPI) that uses either technology S1 or S2, or (b)
to invest in a flexible SPI that allows switching between the
two compatible technologies. The model also aims to explore
when it would be cost-effective to continue using the current
technology and when the firm is better off switching to a
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compatible technology. The authors use dynamic programming
to derive the value of investing in an SPI.
Benaroch, in [26], used a real options model to reframe the
cybersecurity investment problem as one of selecting a subset
of uncertainty-reducing mitigations that may have substitutive,
complementary or synergetic relationships. The availability of
these mitigations is controlled by decision-makers, but their
size is log-normally distributed. The innovation of his work
is to improve the efficiency of cybersecurity investments by
balancing mitigations’ costs against their incremental (dimin-
ishing) uncertainty-reduction impacts on cybersecurity loss
expectancy. From a practical point of view, the author’s model
facilitates lowering cybersecurity costs without compromising
on loss-prevention potential. However, one limitation is that the
availability of mitigations is typically subject to technological
innovations that take place at random points in time. Ignoring
this stochasticity may result in a dynamic inefficiency with
possible cycles of under- or over-investment, and, in turn,
increased regulatory risk when corrective policy actions are
required. In our model, we relax the assumptions underlying
the availability of cybersecurity controls and introduce uncer-
tainty over their arrival.
Finally, Berthold and Bo¨hme, in [27], have motivated why,
and explained how, option pricing theory can be useful for the
valuation of informational privacy. They have proposed a very
simple model that highlights the description of changes in each
individual data subject’s attribute values and the evolution of
the distribution of attribute values in the population as two
independent stochastic processes. The authors suggest possi-
ble applications of the proposed valuation methods to guide
decision support in future privacy-enhancing technologies.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a firm with a perpetual option to invest in
cybersecurity facing uncertainty over the cost of a successful
security breach and over the release (i.e., arrival) of new
cybersecurity controls (e.g., anti-malware) that may be adopted
to enhance the cybersecurity of the firm. Given a probability
space (Ω, F , P), we assume that the arrival of new cyberse-
curity controls follows a Poisson process, {Mt, t ≥ 0}, where
t is continuous and denotes time and λ ≥ 0 denotes the
intensity of the Poisson process. The latter represents the rate
of arrival of cybersecurity controls, and, therefore, Mt counts
the number of random times that a control arrives between 0
and t. Hence, if no control has been developed until time t,
then, with probability λdt, it will arrive within the next short
interval of time dt, i.e.:
dMt =
{
1, with probability λdt
0, with probability 1− λdt
In this paper, we refer to the firm’s operation as the project,
which is a typical expression used in the literature of real
options (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Let us assume that the
project generates a fixed revenue per unit of time denoted by
P and the immediate loss following a cybersecurity breach
follows a continuous-time stochastic process and is denoted by
TABLE I. LIST OF SYMBOLS
Symbol Description
t time
Mt arrival process of security software
Ct immediate loss due to a cybersecurity breach
λ intensity of Mt
P output price
µ annual growth
σ annual volatility
dZt increment of Brownian motion
r discount rate
F
(0)
1,0 (C) option to abandon a project
I0 fixed cost for exercising F
(0)
1,0 (C)
τ
(0)
1,0 time of abandonment
C
(0)∗
1,0 abandonment threshold
Φ
(0)
0 (C) project expected value in the inactive state
D project efficiency in benchmark case
D project efficiency prior to a security breach
D project efficiency after a security breach
{Ct, t ≥ 0}. In line, with the discrete-time model of Gordon
et al. [6], we assume that Ct follows a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM), which is described in (1), where µ is the
annual growth rate, σ is the annual volatility, and dZt is
the increment of the standard Brownian motion. Although we
could use another stochastic process to describe the dynamics
of the loss following a cybersecurity breach, we persist with
the GBM for its analytical tractability and continuity with the
real options literature.
dCt = µCtdt+ σCtdZt, C0 ≡ C > 0 (1)
Also, we let r ≥ µ denote the subjective discount rate,
which is defined exogenously. We assume that {Ct, t ≥ 0}
is independent of {Mt, t ≥ 0}. This enables the analysis
when the firm has no information about the arrival of new
cybersecurity controls, and, therefore, the firm does not take
into account how new controls will affect the immediate loss
incurred by an attack.
We assume that the firm is initially in an active state, denoted
by 1, and holds the option to abandon the project in the case
of a cybersecurity breach, thereby entering an inactive state,
denoted by 0.
In state 1, the firm holds some information that may affect
future cybersecurity investments. These include:
• the current cybersecurity level (i.e., the overall efficacy
of the firm in terms of protecting itself against cyber at-
tacks), which is determined by the types of cybersecurity
controls the company has in place;
• the current threat landscape (i.e., attack trends) that
determines the probability of an attack being launched
and being successful. Altogether, the above express what
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we refer to in the cybersecurity literature [3] as expected
risk.
Apparently, if there is no available budget to invest in
cybersecurity, there is no embedded option available. Thus, in
the absence of an embedded option to enhance its cybersecurity
level, the firm’s option to abandon the project is denoted
by F (0)1,0 (C). The firm can exercise this option by incurring
a fixed cost, I0. The motivation of abandonment is that the
firm does not wish to maintain an active project that does not
generate any profit, and, even worse, introduces only damages.
As indicated in Figure 2, the firm will either abandon the
project immediately if the optimal abandonment threshold,
denoted by C(0)
∗
1,0 , is greater than the current loss C or postpone
abandonment otherwise.
Active project
Determine the optimal
termination threshold, C(0)
∗
1,0
Abandon
Immediately
Postpone
Abandonment
Ct ↑
C
(0)∗
1,0 ≥ C C(0)
∗
1,0 < C
Fig. 2. Benchmark case.
Once the firm abandons the project at time τ (0)1,0 , it recovers
the salvageable operating cost but eliminates the revenues that
the project generates. The expected value of the project in the
inactive state is denoted by Φ(0)0 (C). We capture the described
abandonment in a state transition diagram in Figure 3.
0
F
(0)
1,0 (C)
τ
(0)
1,0
Φ
(0)
0 (C)
t
Fig. 3. State transition diagram: Permanent abandonment
However, the firm may have the option to invest in a
cybersecurity control and reduce the likelihood of terminating
the project due to a cybersecurity breach, as shown in Figure
4. Hence, we assume that the project is operating initially at a
low efficiency level D and a cybersecurity control will increase
the efficiency of the project to D. Note that this level is not the
same as the cybersecurity level and it refers to the productivity
of the company regardless of cybersecurity attacks. Exercising
this option entails a cost I1. The time at which the option is
exercised is denoted by τ (1)1,0 and the corresponding optimal
investment threshold is denoted by C(1)
∗
1,0 .
Active project
Determine the optimal
suspension threshold, C(1)
∗
1,0
Suspend
Immediately
Postpone
Suspension
Determine the optimal
resumption threshold, C(0)
∗
0,1
Resume
Immediately
Suspend
Resumption
Ct ↑
Ct ↓
C
(0)∗
0,1 ≥ CC(0)
∗
0,1 < C
C
(1)∗
1,0 ≥ C C(1)
∗
1,0 < C
Fig. 4. Investment with a single cybersecurity control.
IV. MODEL
A. Benchmark case: No cybersecurity control
We assume that the firm has no option to invest in any
type of cybersecurity control that will improve the efficiency
of the project. Initially, the firm is in state (1, 0), where it
receives the cash-flows of the active project and holds a single
option to abandon it, when the cost of cyber attacks reaches
the threshold C(0)1,0 . Once the option is exercised at time τ
(0)
1,0 ,
the firm moves to state 0 and terminates the operations of the
project (see Figure 5).
1, 0 0
τ
(0)
1,0
Fig. 5. State transition diagram
We derive the value function of the firm at each state by
using backward induction. Therefore, we assume that the cost
associated with cybersecurity breaches is low, and, therefore,
the firm can continue operating the project. All the cash flows
of the project are indicated in Figure 6.
0
∫ τ(0)1,0
0
e−rt [PD + rI0] dt
τ
(0)
1,0
∫ ∞
τ
(0)
1,0
e−rtCtdt
t
Fig. 6. Irreversible abandonment under uncertainty.
2169-3536 (c) 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2773366, IEEE Access
6
The firm’s objective is to maximize the time-zero discounted
expected value of all the cash flows of the project, which is
indicated in (2). More specifically, the firm wants to determine
the time at which it is optimal to terminate the revenues of
the project (first term) in order to recover the salvageable
increasing cost of the cyber attacks (second term). Note that
EC [·] is the expectation operator that is conditional on the
initial cost value.
EC
[∫ τ(0)1,0
0
e−rt [PD + rI0] dt+
∫ ∞
τ
(0)
1,0
e−rtCtdt
]
(2)
By decomposing the first term in (2), we obtain (3).∫ ∞
0
e−rt [PD + rI0] dt+
EC
[∫ ∞
τ
(0)
1,0
e−rt [Ct − PD − rI0] dt
]
(3)
Notice that the first term in (3) is deterministic, and, therefore,
the optimisation objective is reflected in the second term and is
described in (4), where S is the set of stopping times generated
by the filtration of the Ct.
F
(0)
1,0 (C) = sup
τ
(0)
1,0∈S
EC
∫ ∞
τ
(0)
1,0
e−rt [Ct − PD − rI0] dt (4)
Next, we rewrite (4) as in (5) using the law of iterated
expectations and the strong Markov property of the GBM. The
latter states that the value of the process Ct after time t depends
on the value of the process at time t and is independent of the
value of the process before time t.
F
(0)
1,0 (C) = sup
τ
(0)
1,0∈S
EC
[
e−rτ
(0)
1,0
]
Φ
(0)
0
(
C
(0)
1,0
)
(5)
Note that Φ(0)0 (C) is the value of the project at abandon-
ment. The expression of the value of the terminated project is
indicated in (6). The first term on the right-hand side of (6)
is the expected present value of the salvageable operating cost
and the second term is the present value of the foregone cash
flows.
Φ
(0)
0 (C) = EC
∫ ∞
0
e−rt [Ct − PD − rI0] dt
=
C
r − µ −
PD
r
− I0 (6)
Also, EC
[
e−rτ
(0)
1,0
]
=
(
C
C
(0)
1,0
)β1
is the stochastic discount
factor, and, therefore, the optimisation objective can finally
be expressed as in (7).
F
(0)
1,0 (C) = max
C
(0)∗
1,0 >C
(
C
C
(0)
1,0
)β1
Φ
(0)
0
(
C
(0)
1,0
)
(7)
Also β1 > 1, β2 < 0 are the roots of the quadratic 12σ
2β(β −
1) + µβ − r = 0 (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994), i.e:
β1 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(8)
β2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(9)
Applying first-order necessary conditions (FONC) to (7), we
obtain the analytical expression of the optimal investment
threshold, C(0)
∗
1,0 , which is indicated in (10). Notice that,
since β1 > 1, the first term on the right-hand side of (10),
β1
β1−1 , is also greater than 1. This implies that C
(0)∗
1,0 >
(r − µ) [PDr + I0]. Additionally, the term (r − µ) [PDr + I0]
represents the Marshallian threshold, i.e., the investment crite-
rion under the NPV rule. This reflects the traditional result of
real options theory that uncertainty increases the incentive to
postpone an irreversible decision. In this case, the firm would
not want to terminate the project due to a temporary increase
in the cost of a cybersecurity breach, which is more likely to
happen when uncertainty is high.
C
(0)∗
1,0 =
β1
β1 − 1(r − µ)
[
PD
r
+ I0
]
(10)
The optimal investment rule can also be expressed as in
(11), where we equate the marginal benefit (MB) of delaying
abandonment to the marginal cost (MC). The first term on the
left-hand side of (11) is the MB created by waiting until the
salvageable cost is higher, while the second term represents
the reduction in the MC of waiting due to saved abandonment
cost. Similarly, the first term on the right–hand side reflects
the opportunity cost of forgone cash flows discounted appro-
priately.
(
C
C
(0)∗
1,0
)β1 [
1
r − µ +
β1
C
(0)∗
1,0
(
PD
r
+ I0
)]
=
(
C
C
(0)∗
1,0
)β1
β1
r − µ (11)
B. Single cybersecurity control
Here, we extend the framework of Section IV-A by allowing
for a single embedded option to invest in a cybersecurity
control, that will increase the efficiency of the project. The
value of the active project is indicated in (12). The first term
on the right-hand side is the expected present value of the
revenues, while the second term is the present value of the
operating cost.
Φ
(0)
1 (C) =
PD
r
− C
r − µ − I1 (12)
Assuming that the cost is initially high, the firm must wait until
it drops below the revenues in order to resume operations. The
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firm’s value function is described in (13)
F
(0)
0,1 (C) =

A
(0)
0,1C
β2 , C > C
(0)
0,1
Φ
(0)
1 (C) , C ≤ C(0)0,1
(13)
where A(0)0,1 and C
(0)
0,1 are determined via value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions and are indicated in (14) and (15),
respectively. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
C
(0)∗
0,1 =
β2
1− β2 (r − µ)
[
I1 − PD
r
]
(14)
A
(0)
0,1 = C
(0)∗−β2
0,1 Φ
(0)
1
(
C
(0)∗
0,1
)
(15)
Next, we step back and assume that the project is in a
suspended state and that the firm holds a single embedded
investment option. The dynamics of the value of the suspended
project are described in (16). Notice that within an infinitesimal
time interval dt a cybersecurity control may become available
with probability λdt and the firm will receive the option,
F
(0)
0,1 (C), to adopt it and upgrade the efficiency of the project
to D. By contrast, with probability 1 − λdt no cybersecurity
control will become available and the firm will continue to
hold the value function Φ(1)0 (P ).
Φ
(1)
0 (C) = (1− rdt)EC
[
λdtF
(0)
0,1 (C + dC) (16)
+(1− λdt)Φ(1)0 (C + dC)
]
By expanding the right-hand side of (16) using Itoˆ’s lemma,
we can rewrite it as in (17), where L = 12σ2C2 d
2
dC2 + µC
d
dC
denotes the differential generator.
[L − (r + λ)] Φ(1)0 (C) + λF (0)0,1 (C) = 0 (17)
By solving (17), we obtain the expression for Φ(1)0 (C) that
is described in (18), where B(1)0 and E
(1)
0 are obtained via
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the
two branches and are indicated in (A-7) and (A-8). The first
term in the top part of (18) reflects the value of the firm’s
option to enhance the cybersecurity of its information systems.
However, this option is not available yet, and, therefore, the
first term is adjusted via the second one. The first three terms in
the bottom part of (18) represent the expected revenues upon
investment, while the last term is the likelihood of the cost
increasing above the waiting region.
Φ
(1)
0 (C) =

A
(0)
0,1C
β2 +B
(1)
0 C
δ2 , C > C
(0)
0,1
λPD
r(r+λ) − λC(r−µ)(r+λ−µ) − λI1r+λ
+E
(1)
0 C
δ1 , C ≤ C(0)0,1
(18)
Notice that it is possible to recover the deterministic scenario,
reflected in (13), by setting either λ = 0 or λ → ∞. Indeed,
λ = 0 implies that a new cybersecurity patch (note that we
use the terms cybersecurity patch and cybersecurity control
interchangeably) will never become available, and, thus, both
the top and the bottom part of (18) vanish, since λ = 0⇒ δ2 =
β2 ⇒ B(1)0 = −A(0)0,1. Similarly, as λ increases, the arrival of a
new cybersecurity patch becomes more likely. Indeed, notice
that λ→∞⇒ B(1)0 → 0.
Next, we consider the option to suspend operations tem-
porarily with a singe embedded option to invest in a cyber-
security control. This is expressed in (19) and the optimal
investment threshold is now obtained numerically.
F
(1)
1,0 (C) = max
C
(1)
1,0>C
(
C
C
(1)
1,0
)β1 [
C
(1)
1,0
r − µ −
PD
r
− I0
+Φ
(1)
0
(
C
(1)
1,0
)]
, C < C
(1)
0,1 (19)
The optimal suspension rule is indicated in (20), where we
equate the MB of delaying suspension to the MC. Notice that
this is the same as (11) apart from the extra two terms on
the right-hand side, that reflect the extra cost associated with
uncertainty over the arrival of a cybersecurity patch.(
C
C
(1)∗
1,0
)β1 [
1
r − µ +
β
1
C
(1)∗
1,0
(
PD
r
+ I1
)]
=
(
C
C
(1)∗
1,0
)β1 [
β1
r − µ − (δ2 − β1)B
(1)
0 C
(1)∗δ2−1
1,0
−(β2 − β1)A(1)0 C(1)
∗β2−1
1,0
]
(20)
According to Proposition 1, abandonment is accelerated
when the option to invest in a cybersecurity control is avail-
able. This happens because the option to invest in cyberse-
curity increases the overall value of the project and lowers
the required abandonment threshold. Intuitively, unlike the
benchmark case, the firm does not have to keep the project
alive despite potential losses, if it has the option to resume
operations with a more resilient system following a temporary
suspension that is required to enhance cybersecurity.
Proposition 1. An embedded option to invest in a cybersecu-
rity control accelerates abandonment, i.e., C(1)
∗
1,0 < C
(0)∗
1,0 .
Now, as the following Proposition 2 indicates, the relative gain
in option value increases with greater λ. Notice that if λ = 0,
then a new cybersecurity patch will not become available and
the efficiency of the project will always be D. By contrast,
a greater λ raises the relative gain in option value, since a
cybersecurity patch is more likely.
Proposition 2. Uncertainty over the cost of a cybersecurity
breach and the arrival of a cybersecurity patch raises the
relative gain in option value,
F
(1)
1,0 (C)−F (0)1,0 (C)
F
(1)
1,0 (C)
.
In line with Proposition 1, we can show that the prob-
ability of abandonment increases when the firm holds an
embedded option to enhance the cybersecurity of its infor-
mation systems. For a GBM, the probability of suspension
PC
[
C ≥ C(1)∗1,0
]
within T years given that the current cost is
C is provided in closed form and is indicated in (21). Note
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that N (·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the
standard normal distribution.
PC
[
C ≥ C(1)∗1,0
]
= N

(
µ− 12σ2
)
T − ln
(
C
(1)∗
1,0
C
)
σ
√
T
 (21)
C. Numerical Examples
For a simple numerical illustration, we assume the following
parameter values: µ = 0.01, r = 0.1, σ ∈ [0.1, 0.2]. Also,
I1 = 100, I2 = 200, D = 1, D = 2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Although
it would be interesting to calibrate these to real data, here, we
are primarily concerned with illustrating analytical insights via
hypothetical parameters. The top panel in Figure 7 illustrates
the value of the option to terminate operations and the value
of the suspended project for σ = 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2. Notice
that, in the absence of uncertainty, the firm should abandon
the project at C = 27. This is the Marshallian threshold and
reflects the NPV rule. The latter states that the firm should
terminate operations when the NPV of the project is zero.
However, increasing uncertainty raises the opportunity cost of
abandonment and raises the required abandonment threshold.
Intuitively, the firm would not want to terminate operations
permanently in the case of a temporary increase in cost, which
is more likely when uncertainty is high. The same result is
illustrated in the bottom panel, which shows the impact of σ
on the required abandonment threshold.
In the top panel of Figure 8, we assume that the current
cost value is C = 35 and illustrate the impact of σ on the
probability of abandonment within T = 1, 1.5 and 2 years.
Notice that abandonment becomes less likely with greater cost
uncertainty and more likely as the time horizon increases.
According to the bottom panel, the MB and MC of delaying
abandonment both decrease as the cybersecurity cost increases.
However, for low values of Ct, the MB is greater than the MC,
which implies that the marginal value of delaying investment
is positive, thereby creating an incentive to postpone the
termination of the project.
Figure 9, illustrates the option and project value with and
without the embedded investment option (top panel) and
the impact of cost uncertainty on the optimal abandonment
threshold (bottom panel). As the top panel illustrates, the
embedded investment option raises the value of the project
and lowers the required abandonment threshold. The same
result is observable in the bottom panel, which illustrates the
impact of cost uncertainty on both the optimal abandonment
and suspension threshold.
The top panel in Figure 10 illustrates the impact of the
embedded option to invest and improve the efficiency of the
project on the probability of abandonment. Notice that the
direction of the arrows indicates the increase in operational
flexibility and the associated increase in the probability of
suspension. The bottom panel illustrates the combined impact
of uncertainty over the availability of a cybersecurity patch and
the cost of cyberattacks on the relative gain in option value.
Note that greater uncertainty raises the value of the embedded
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Fig. 7. Option and project value for σ = 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2 (top panel) and
optimal abandonment threshold versus σ (bottom panel).
option to invest in cybersecurity. Interestingly, a greater like-
lihood of the availability of a cybersecurity patch makes the
option to invest in cybersecurity particularly valuable under
high cost uncertainty.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We develop a real options framework in order to analyse
how uncertainty over (i) the cost of cyber attacks, and (ii)
the arrival of cybersecurity controls impacts a firm’s optimal
investment strategy. We assume that the cost of cybersecurity
breaches follows a GBM and that cybersecurity controls be-
come available at random points in time according to a Poisson
process. In line with Gordon et al. [6], our results indicate
that uncertainty over the cost of cyber attacks raises the value
of waiting, and, in our case, the firm’s incentive to delay
2169-3536 (c) 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2773366, IEEE Access
9
Volatility, σ
0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
of
A
b
an
d
on
m
en
t
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
T = 1 year
T = 1.5 year
T = 2 year
Cost, Ct
35 40 45 50 55
M
B
v
s
M
C
of
D
el
ay
in
g
A
b
an
d
on
m
en
t
×10-3
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Marginal Benefit
Marginal Cost
Optimal Abandonment Threshold
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permanent abandonment. This result reflects the relationship
between uncertainty and irreversibility, specifically that the
firm would not want to terminate operations permanently due
to temporary high cost that are more likely to occur when un-
certainty is high. In addition, we extend the existing literature
on cybersecurity investment by allowing for uncertainty over
the arrival of a cybersecurity control. Specifically, we show
how uncertainty over the impact of cybersecurity breaches
interacts with uncertainty over the availability of cybersecurity
controls to impact a firm’s investment opportunity. Also, we
find that the option to invest in cybersecurity increases the
incentive to suspend operations temporarily in order to enhance
cybersecurity, thus resuming operations when the system be-
comes resilient. In terms of future work, we intend to relax the
assumption of risk neutrality and study how risk aversion due
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Fig. 9. Option and project value with and without cybersecurity control for
σ = 0.2 and λ = 0.3 (top panel) and optimal abandonment threshold versus
σ (bottom panel).
to technical risk affects the optimal investment policy via a
utility-based framework [28]. We further aim to accommodate
a different stochastic process in order to relax the limitations
inherent in the GBM.
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APPENDIX
A. Single Insurance Option: Proofs
The value of the option to invest and restore the efficiency of
the project is indicated in (A-1). The first two terms on the
top part of A-1 reflect the immediate profit.
F
(0)
0,1 (C) =

(1− rdt)EC
[
F
(0)
0,1 (C + dC)
]
, C > C
(0)
0,1
PD
r − Cr−µ − I , C ≤ C(0)0,1
(A-1)
By expanding the top branch on the right-hand side of
(A-1) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain the differential equation
for F (0)0,1 (P ). The latter is indicated in (A-2), where L =
1
2σ
2C2 d
2
dC2 + µC
d
dC denotes the differential generator.
[L − r]F (0)0,1 (C) = 0, C > C(0)0,1 (A-2)
The solution of (A-2) for C > C(0)0,1 takes the form A
(0)
0,1C
β2 ,
and, therefore, F (0)0,1 (C) is indicated in (A-3).
F
(0)
0,1 (C) =

A
(0)
0,1C
β2 , C > C
(0)
0,1
PD
r − Cr−µ − I1 , C ≤ C(0)0,1
(A-3)
The endogenous constant, A(0)0,1, and the optimal investment
threshold, C(0)∗0,1 , are determined via the value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions between the two branches. These
conditions are indicated in (A-4) and (A-5).
A
(0)
0,1C
β2 = Φ
(0)
1 (C)
∣∣∣∣∣
C=C
(0)∗
0,1
(A-4)
β2A
(0)
0,1C
β2−1 =
dΦ
(0)
1 (C)
dC
∣∣∣∣∣
C=C
(0)∗
0,1
(A-5)
Solving for A(0)0,1 and C
(0)∗
0,1 we obtain the expressions indicated
in (14) and (15).
Next, we step back and consider the expected value of the
suspended project, (A-6).
Φ
(1)
0 (C) =

A
(0)
0,1C
β2 +B
(1)
0 C
δ2 , C > C
(0)
0,1
λPD
r(r+λ) − λC(r−µ)(r+λ−µ) − λI1r+λ
+E
(1)
0 C
δ1 , C ≤ C(0)0,1
(A-6)
The endogenous constants B(1)0 and E
(1)
0 are determined via
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the
two branches and are indicated in (A-7) and (A-8).
B
(1)
0 =
C
(0)−δ2
0,1
δ1 − δ2
[
δ1λPD
r(r + λ)
− (δ1 − 1)λC
(0)
0,1
(r − µ)(r + λ− µ)
− δ1λI1
(r + λ)
− (δ1 − β2)A(0)0,1C(0)
−β2
0,1
]
(A-7)
E
(1)
0 =
C
(0)−δ1
0,1
δ1 − δ2
[
δ2λPD
r(r + λ)
− (δ2 − 1)λC
(0)
0,1
(r − µ)(r + λ− µ)
− δ2λI1
(r + λ)
− (δ2 − β2)A(0)0,1C(0)
−β2
0,1
]
(A-8)
Notice that by setting λ = 0 we have δ1 = β1 and δ2 = β2.
Hence, B(1)0 =
C−β2
β1−β2
[
−(β1 − β2)A(0)0,1Cβ2
]
= −A(0)0,1.
Proposition 1 An embedded option to invest in a cybersecurity
control accelerates abandonment, i.e., C(1)
∗
1,0 < C
(0)∗
1,0 .
Proof: The embedded option to restore the efficiency of the
project to its original level raises the expected value of the
investment opportunity and lowers the optimal investment
threshold. Equivalently, note that compared to (11), the extra
two terms on the right-hand side of (20) raise the MC of
delaying suspension, thereby decreasing the marginal value of
delaying suspension and increasing the incentive to suspend
operations.
Proposition 2 Uncertainty over the cost of a cybersecurity
breach and the arrival of a security patch raises the relative
gain in option value,
F
(1)
1,0 (C)−F (0)1,0 (C)
F
(1)
1,0 (C)
.
Proof: The maximised value of the option to abandon in the
absence of a cybersecurity investment option is indicated in
(A-9).
F
(0)
1,0 (C) =
(
C
C
(0)∗
1,0
)β1
Φ
(0)
0
(
C
(0)∗
1,0
)
(A-9)
If the firm has a single embedded investment option, then
the value of the option to suspend operation temporarily is
indicated in (A-11).
F
(1)
1,0 (C) =
(
C
C
(1)
1,0
)β1 [
C
(1)
1,0
r − µ −
PD
r
− I0
+Φ
(1)
0
(
C
(1)
1,0
)]
, C > C
(0)
0,1 (A-10)
Notice that F (1)1,0 (C) = F
(0)
1,0 (C) for λ = 0. By contrast, if
λ → ∞, then the maximised value of the option to invest is
indicated in (A-11).
F
(1)
1,0 (C) =
(
C
C
(1)
1,0
)β1 [
C
(1)
1,0
r − µ −
PD
r
− I0 +A(0)0,1Cβ2
]
(A-11)
Consequently, for λ = 0 the relative gain in option value is
zero, whereas for λ → ∞ the relative gain in option value is
indicated in (A-12).
F
(1)
1,0 (C)− F (0)1,0 (C)
F
(1)
1,0 (C)
= 1− Φ
(0)
0
Φ
(1)
0
(A-12)
